‘According to Strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriatelyprogrammed computer really is a mind…said to understand and have other cognitive states’.
Searle is here going to object to claims that an ‘appropriately programmed computer’ can have cognitive states and can explain human cognition by refering [...]
Archive for the ‘Philosophy of Mind’ Category
John Searle- ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, tagged AI, Artificial Intelligence, Brains, Minds, Programs, Searle on June 3, 2008 | 2 Comments »
Frank Jackson- ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, tagged Brain, Epiphenomenalism, Mind, nagel, Qualia, sense data on June 2, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
‘I am what is sometimes known as a qualia freak. I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences which no amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind [...]
J Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes (The Identity Thesis)
Posted in Philosophy of Mind on May 26, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
Aim of Paper is to Defend Place’s position: that all states of consciousness are nothing more than mental processes.
‘When I ”report” a pain, I am not really reporting anything…[this is the] suggestion I wish if possible to avoid’. He believes that ‘I am in pain is a genuine report…what it reports it an irredcibly physical [...]
The Argument from Illusion
Posted in Knowledge and Perception, Philosophy of Mind, tagged bent stick, deception, illusion, perception, sense data, sense datum, senses on May 25, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
The argument from illusion is an argument for the existence of sense-data.
When we observe a straight stick half submerged in water, it appears bent. This is an illusion. Seems the stick is not in fact bent, the bent stick that we are seeing is an illusion. It is examples like this that have lead some [...]
David Chalmer’s ‘Consciousness and its place in nature’
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, Uncategorized, tagged causation, consciousness, David Chalmer, dualism, epiphenimenalism, Mind, nature, type-e on May 12, 2008 | 1 Comment »
5.10 Type-E Dualism (Epiphenomenalism)
This is the view that ‘phenomenal properties’ are different from physical properties. That phenomenal properties can have no effect on the physical. In other words, there are two properties, the physical and the mental.
‘Physical states cause phenomenal states, but not vice versa’. So the psychophysical laws run only from phenomenal to physical, [...]
On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History (T. H. Huxley)
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, tagged animals, automata, brutes, consciousness, dualism, fatalism, free will, materialism, Mind, monism, nature of thought, reflexes, soul on May 12, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
READING NOTES
Descartes’ doctrine states that brute animals are nothing more than automata and have no reason or consciousness. This is a doctrine that has caused much discussion.
Descartes comes to this conclusion because he believes that the entire behavioural aspects and movements of animals could be performed by machines. This is not the case for [...]
