In the second paper, Bradley aims to put forward a more detailed objection to the fine-tuning argument than other papers had in the past. In short, the first bulk of the paper discusses what he calls the ‘common form’ of the fine-tuning argument which appeals to the sheer improbability of the various conditions of life being met, which implies that a theistic explanation is needed because leaving these conditions to chance seems so unlikely.
His first objection is that we simply can’t find anything that makes our present conditions so significant that it warrants an explanation in terms of fine tuning. He makes an analogy to a pack of ‘well-shuffled’ cards, which, when dealt, are in the exact same order as when they left the factory. He says that this order would trigger us to presume that this was, as he calls it, a ‘put-up job’, but he doesn’t see why we consider this perfect hand as so significant and why we consider the conditions of life as so significant.
Saying that life is valuable, and this is why the conditions are significant only moves the improbability up a level. We now ask why the realization of the necessary conditions for value should be regarded as significant.
Saying that the complex-orderliness of life is what adds significance to present conditions, and that evolution can’t explain this, as the conditions necessary for evolution to take place are so improbable in themselves, meets the same problems, because it seems there is still nothing that makes those conditions more significant than any alternative. Just because we can see a tidy way of explaining the way the world is, it doesn’t mean that a special explanation is actually needed (bottom of p455).
Davies says significance could come from the very improbable conditions for the existence of minds being met, but this doesn’t seem to work either, for the same reasons as the other two suggestions fail. Even if we consider mind as immaterial, we would have no justification for appealing to fine-tuning, because we have no idea whatsoever of the necessary conditions of anything immaterial. We don’t know whether these conditions are in fact improbable, because there could be something that necessitates the existence of mind without appealing to fine-tuning at all.
Swinburne, who is a dualist, and one of the most well-known proponents of the Bayesian argument, carries on this mind idea, and says that the likelihood of there being these complex bodies and organs capable of being vehicles for the mind, and the likelihood of having these capable of working in perfect harmony with an immaterial mind apparently adds even more to the significance of our present conditions. But Bradley again says that we don’t know that these complex organs are in fact needed for embodiment (p457), something else; an infinite number of other possible conditions could have allowed for the embodiment of a mind also, so once again, nothing significant has been pinpointed. Thus, overall, appealing to an immaterial mind or the embodiment of an immaterial mind adds nothing to the case for fine-tuning.
Bradley then brings in a possible objection to all of the preceding points. So far, all that has been considered is individual sets of conditions, whereas, if we consider the likelihood of life forming against the vast conditions under which life could not have formed taken together, we see that it seems massively lucky that this single set of fortunate conditions is what occurred, and Swinburne thinks that this is what calls for an explanation.
But Bradley thinks he can counter this, for there will be so many different sets of conditions that will still allow for life to form. The more there are, the less significant it seems that one of them was actualized.
This is where he brings in his example of ‘Life’ and ‘Strife’, which are complete opposites. It seems that the likelihood of either one of these occurring is massively improbable.
In other words, if we hold Smarts position and say that actualization of these conditions are so lucky that we must appeal to a fine-tuner, we are also committed to saying that a fine-tuner would be needed as an explanation if it were Strife that had occurred, not Life, which seems bizarre, so there is again, no reason to postulate a fine-tuner.
He also says that we need a good reason to compare the probability of Life with all other possibilities taken together. As was argued in the first half of the paper, there is no reason to assign significance to one set of conditions, as there is with a pack of cards. Without a way of assigning significance to Life, there seems to be no basis to compare its probability with the collective probability of the alternatives. You can only usefully do this when you can make one alternative stand out from the rest.
The Bayesian Argument
The Bayesian Argument is an alternative to the common form argument, which is thought to answer the problems of the common form.
Basically it’s saying that intelligent life is something God has reason to bring about, so, if he exists, it’s quite likely that intelligent life would occur. Without God’s agency, it is extremely improbable to have come about, so intelligent life is evidence for God’s existence. In other words, conditions for life are only improbable if left to chance. If not left to chance, they are no longer improbable. So, given the truth of the hypothesis, it seems likely that fine-tuning is the case.
This would provide the significance Bradley was looking for in Life’s conditions earlier in that they are conditions for something of great value (p463).
But appealing to value like this was already mentioned. We have no reason to assume that the conditions for value are at all significant. Swinburne’s reply was that creating value is something a deity would do, but this isn’t enough as it’s merely arguing to significance, not from it, and for his argument to fully hold, he would have to somehow support a more objectivist view of value, maybe based on God’s will, which is another thing that is in question.
Bradley says that although this provides an explanation for the way the world is, there is nothing in it that says why a special explanation is actually needed.
Overall, Bradley has been looking for some way of showing that improbability is significant, and has failed to do so. Both the common-form, and the Bayesian argument fail to provide this significance when critiqued, so the fine-tuning argument, which rests on there being some significance in improbability does not seem to stand up to these arguments.
When I was reading it, there are a few things I thought would be worth discussing;
- Can we really consider Life and it’s opposite, Strife, to have the same probability, because, if not then Bradley’s argument will be weakened, as Life could once again be seen as being the most unlikely set of conditions, thus the theist wouldn’t be as troubled by that objection.
- Also, I’m not sure about the Bayesian argument, as I didn’t follow it too well, but with Swinburne’s account, I was wondering what his basis was for assuming that intelligent life was so important for a deity to create. Surely if this is a traditional, omnibenevolent, theistic deity, then creating intelligent life capable of sinning would deplete the overall percentage of goodness in the universe meaning that the theist would have even more questions to answer by appealing to fine tuning
- Finally by looking through history, we see that God is often introduced as a God-of-the-gap, to fill in the spaces that science had not yet answered. Could this not just be the case for this example, and that we are introducing god just to satisfy our curiosity?
