An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
LOCKE= ‘SO FAR AS A MAN HAS POWER TO THINK OR NOT TO THINK, TO MOVE OR NOT TO MOVE, ACCORDING TO THE PREFERENCES OR DIRECTION OF HIS OWN MIND, SO FAR IS A MAN FREE’
REPLY- But ‘How does the mind prefer thinking of a thing to not thinking of it? [...]
Archive for June, 2008
John Locke- Free Will Not to Carry Out What One Wills
Posted in free will, tagged free will, Liberty, Locke on June 5, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
David Chalmers- ‘The Puzzle of Conscious Experience’
Posted in Uncategorized on June 4, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
‘Conscious experience is the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious…why does it exist? what does it do? how could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.’
‘Conscious: the subjective, inner life of the mind.’
‘Over the past several years an [...]
Disjunctivism Lecture Notes
Posted in Knowledge and Perception, tagged Disjunctivism, perception on June 4, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
There are 3 thesis about perception
Phenomenal Principle: S perceives a –> a exists
Common Kind assumptions: all perceptions are of the same kind, whether they be hallucinations, veridical perceptions etc. They are all fundementally the same.
Mind Independence- We are directly aware of mind-independent physical objects.
Phenomenal Principle Common Kind Mind-Independence
Sense Datum Y Y N
Intentionalism N Y Y
Disjunctivism [...]
John Searle- ‘Minds, Brains and Programs’
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, tagged AI, Artificial Intelligence, Brains, Minds, Programs, Searle on June 3, 2008 | 2 Comments »
‘According to Strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriatelyprogrammed computer really is a mind…said to understand and have other cognitive states’.
Searle is here going to object to claims that an ‘appropriately programmed computer’ can have cognitive states and can explain human cognition by refering [...]
Frank Jackson- ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’
Posted in Philosophy of Mind, tagged Brain, Epiphenomenalism, Mind, nagel, Qualia, sense data on June 2, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
‘I am what is sometimes known as a qualia freak. I think that there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences which no amount of purely physical information includes. Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the kind [...]
Intentionalism Notes
Posted in Knowledge and Perception, tagged armstrong, intentioanalism, representationalism, sense data on June 2, 2008 | Leave a Comment »
Just some quick notes…
Intentionalism rejects the phenomenal principle
Perceptions have cognititve intentional (representational) content- they represent the world as being in a certain way (veridical, not illusory)
We can perceive more things than we have content of (too much data for us to comprehend)
We can have the same intentional content, but different phenomenal character (ie. 2 colours, [...]
