Murray: Coercion and the Hiddenness of God

God’s hiddenness has prompted some theists to provide an explanation for God’s silence. Such hiddenness seems to be closely tied with disbelief, which is a form of sin for most Christians, so why has God allows such conditions to prevail?

Murray intends to show that some resoltions can be made to hiddenness.

A free-will theodicy claims that the existence of free-will causes, allows, or presupposes the possibility of certain evils.

The existence of stable, natural laws is essential for this free will, but these stable laws will sometime result in natural evils such as hurricanes.

‘Specifically, it appears that one cannot act freely when one is in the condition of compulsion by another in the context of a threat‘. And if God doesn’t remain hidden, this could constitute a threat, thus removing our ability to act in a morally significant manner.

If could be said that here, freedom has not been lost, because the threatened can still choose what action to take. What the threat does provide, however, is excuses for the behaviour, which suffices to relieve responsibility.

So, in such cases, freedom simpliciter is not eliminated, but the moral significance of an action is.

But what exactly constitutes a significant threat?

Murray idntifies 3 factors; threat strength, threat imminence, and wantonness of the threatened.

Differing degrees in temporal threat imminence may also axplain the fact that some individuals choose to eat a high-fat diet.

Western theistic traditions involve temporal and eternal threats. And those who are aware of their threats ave their freedom at stake, for there is some degree of compulsion in the threat; compulsion by God.

The theist must explain how this threat can be mitigated so as to prevent the compromising of human freedom. We must look at the 3 factors.

Threat strength and threat imminence do seem to provide a real threat here. Wantonness is unlikely to provide what we are looking for, for developing wantonness seems to fall into the domain of freedom (p209), which is a quite Aristotelian view, thus is GOd were to maintain human freedom, he cannot manipulate this element of the picture.

Thus, we are left with imminence. The only imminence we can really draw upon here is epistemic imminence.

‘My claim here is the hidenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat implied be knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional theistic story’ (p290)

For us to have free will and for our choices to have moral significance, God must ‘decrease the threat imminence of eternal an temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous’.

‘All that is required is that the demonstrative evidence for God’s existence be sufficiently obscured so that it does not compel belief or behaviour in accordance with the perceived divine standard.

In sum, hiddenness seems to preserve the exercise of robust, morally significant free-will.

Does Divine Hiddenness Justify Atheism?

Peterson’s paper is briefly an attack on theism from the angle of Divine Hiddenness. He says that a mother, who’s gargantuan love for her child, would not let that child suffer her absence if she could help it. And this goes for God too. He would not hide from us if we truly wanted to find him; provided he is all loving, and omnipotent.

There are objections to this view, however, which Peterson responds to. I’ll mention a few of these here.

1. We are not like children. We are mature, so the analogy doesn’t hold- But children also seek God, and they don’t get special treatment. He, too, seems to hide from them as well. Also, can we really be seen as mature adults who can fend for ourselves? Surely we are ‘young and uninformed…still in need of parental support and encouragement’.

2. God cannot be thought of as a Mother; he’s more of a Father- But God’s attributes of compassion, empathy, closeness etc are non-negotiable

3. There is something presumptuous about expecting a response from Go. Maybe He is hidden from us because of our own failings- But, we are not asking God to satisfy our every whim. Surely he should respond to serious attempts to be united with him. Also, many who seek God appear to be blameless. There is nothing they can really do to being about belief, thus the non-believercannot be blamed.

4. God might be hiding from us for the purpose of some greater good- But, what could be more important to us than a relationship with this spiritual master whom knowledge of would make such a positive impact on our lives? This is the best thing we could experience, so abandoning this for some other end seems irrational. Why would God sacrifice such a relationship? Also, is seems hard to see how hiding from us in the present could damage our long-term relationship with God, which is what the atheist must show to counter this view.

5. There are other reasons for a belief in God that this argument simply doesn’t override- But, many readers must be without such proofs of God. Such proofs are in short supply.

The Conceptual Argument

The previous argument was that from analogy, this is a more subtle one conceptual argument.

A proper concept of divine love is needed. Many people are not even aware of a need to seek God (nonresisters), but surely the best lvoer (God) should encourage us to find such a relationship, in order that the beloved can flourish. Showing love should be spontaneous, and not be conditional on the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.

Surely, if God did not make a relationship available to these nonresisters, he would not be all loving. If God is all loving, such a relationship WILL be available, but it doesn’t seem to be.

Thus it follows on this readong of God, he does no exist.

As Mr Dylan once pleaded for the love of God;

Well, meet me Jesus, meet me, meet me in the middle of the air
If these wings should fail me, Lord, won’t you meet me with another pair?

Bob Dylan, In My Time of Dyin’

Kant: Critique of Practical Reason

Satisfaction, to Kant, is something ‘imposed upon him by his finite nature itself, because he is needy’, and this satisfaction is something relating to pleasure or displeasure. These feelings are determined by what he needs in order to be satisfied.

This problem of satisfaction is impossible to regard as law, for pleasure and desire varies from person to person. These are ‘general names for subjective determining grounds, and it determines nothing specific about it’. For ‘needs differ as feeling changes’: it is different in different subjects, and hence can never yield a law.

Even if finite rational beings were thoroughly agreed with respect to their feelings of pleasure and the means to this pleasure, this could not constitute a law. ‘This unanimity itself would still be only contingent’, viz. the fact that everyone feels the same, does not make this feeling necessary.

‘It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at all, for such laws must be cognized a priori by reason, not by experience. What this satisfation has as its basis is not objective but subjective conditions of choice, so should be ‘represented as mere maxims, never as practical laws’

Viz. Happiness is not objective, or a law which can be met, as Aristotle held. It is reliant on subjective features, which at best can be expressed as maxims: ‘an expression of a general truth or principle’.

The doctrine of happiness rests on empirical principles, whereas the doctrine of morals does not.

If a man who is hohnest is confronted with the moral law in which he cognizes the worthlessness of a liar, his practical reason at once abandons the advantage [of lying]…

‘Reason does not require that one should renounce claims of happiness but only that as soon as duty is in question on should take no account [of happiness]‘. It can sometimes be a duty to attend to ones happiness as this enables one to meet other duties more fully, ‘however, it can never be a direct duty to promote one’s happiness…they must without exception be separated from the supreme moral principle and never be incorporated with it as a condition, since this would destroy all moral worth.

Viz. Happiness and morals should be kept separate. Morality should never be subject to happiness.

Against the Fine-Tuning Argument

In the second paper, Bradley aims to put forward a more detailed objection to the fine-tuning argument than other papers had in the past. In short, the first bulk of the paper discusses what he calls the ‘common form’ of the fine-tuning argument which appeals to the sheer improbability of the various conditions of life being met, which implies that a theistic explanation is needed because leaving these conditions to chance seems so unlikely.

His first objection is that we simply can’t find anything that makes our present conditions so significant that it warrants an explanation in terms of fine tuning. He makes an analogy to a pack of ‘well-shuffled’ cards, which, when dealt, are in the exact same order as when they left the factory. He says that this order would trigger us to presume that this was, as he calls it, a ‘put-up job’, but he doesn’t see why we consider this perfect hand as so significant and why we consider the conditions of life as so significant.

Saying that life is valuable, and this is why the conditions are significant only moves the improbability up a level. We now ask why the realization of the necessary conditions for value should be regarded as significant.

Saying that the complex-orderliness of life is what adds significance to present conditions, and that evolution can’t explain this, as the conditions necessary for evolution to take place are so improbable in themselves, meets the same problems, because it seems there is still nothing that makes those conditions more significant than any alternative. Just because we can see a tidy way of explaining the way the world is, it doesn’t mean that a special explanation is actually needed (bottom of p455).

Davies says significance could come from the very improbable conditions for the existence of minds being met, but this doesn’t seem to work either, for the same reasons as the other two suggestions fail. Even if we consider mind as immaterial, we would have no justification for appealing to fine-tuning, because we have no idea whatsoever of the necessary conditions of anything immaterial. We don’t know whether these conditions are in fact improbable, because there could be something that necessitates the existence of mind without appealing to fine-tuning at all.

Swinburne, who is a dualist, and one of the most well-known proponents of the Bayesian argument, carries on this mind idea, and says that the likelihood of there being these complex bodies and organs capable of being vehicles for the mind, and the likelihood of having these capable of working in perfect harmony with an immaterial mind apparently adds even more to the significance of our present conditions. But Bradley again says that we don’t know that these complex organs are in fact needed for embodiment (p457), something else; an infinite number of other possible conditions could have allowed for the embodiment of a mind also, so once again, nothing significant has been pinpointed. Thus, overall, appealing to an immaterial mind or the embodiment of an immaterial mind adds nothing to the case for fine-tuning.

Bradley then brings in a possible objection to all of the preceding points. So far, all that has been considered is individual sets of conditions, whereas, if we consider the likelihood of life forming against the vast conditions under which life could not have formed taken together, we see that it seems massively lucky that this single set of fortunate conditions is what occurred, and Swinburne thinks that this is what calls for an explanation.

But Bradley thinks he can counter this, for there will be so many different sets of conditions that will still allow for life to form. The more there are, the less significant it seems that one of them was actualized.

This is where he brings in his example of ‘Life’ and ‘Strife’, which are complete opposites. It seems that the likelihood of either one of these occurring is massively improbable.

In other words, if we hold Smarts position and say that actualization of these conditions are so lucky that we must appeal to a fine-tuner, we are also committed to saying that a fine-tuner would be needed as an explanation if it were Strife that had occurred, not Life, which seems bizarre, so there is again, no reason to postulate a fine-tuner.

He also says that we need a good reason to compare the probability of Life with all other possibilities taken together. As was argued in the first half of the paper, there is no reason to assign significance to one set of conditions, as there is with a pack of cards. Without a way of assigning significance to Life, there seems to be no basis to compare its probability with the collective probability of the alternatives. You can only usefully do this when you can make one alternative stand out from the rest.

The Bayesian Argument

The Bayesian Argument is an alternative to the common form argument, which is thought to answer the problems of the common form.

Basically it’s saying that intelligent life is something God has reason to bring about, so, if he exists, it’s quite likely that intelligent life would occur. Without God’s agency, it is extremely improbable to have come about, so intelligent life is evidence for God’s existence. In other words, conditions for life are only improbable if left to chance. If not left to chance, they are no longer improbable. So, given the truth of the hypothesis, it seems likely that fine-tuning is the case.

This would provide the significance Bradley was looking for in Life’s conditions earlier in that they are conditions for something of great value (p463).

But appealing to value like this was already mentioned. We have no reason to assume that the conditions for value are at all significant. Swinburne’s reply was that creating value is something a deity would do, but this isn’t enough as it’s merely arguing to significance, not from it, and for his argument to fully hold, he would have to somehow support a more objectivist view of value, maybe based on God’s will, which is another thing that is in question.

Bradley says that although this provides an explanation for the way the world is, there is nothing in it that says why a special explanation is actually needed.

Overall, Bradley has been looking for some way of showing that improbability is significant, and has failed to do so. Both the common-form, and the Bayesian argument fail to provide this significance when critiqued, so the fine-tuning argument, which rests on there being some significance in improbability does not seem to stand up to these arguments.

When I was reading it, there are a few things I thought would be worth discussing;

• Can we really consider Life and it’s opposite, Strife, to have the same probability, because, if not then Bradley’s argument will be weakened, as Life could once again be seen as being the most unlikely set of conditions, thus the theist wouldn’t be as troubled by that objection.
• Also, I’m not sure about the Bayesian argument, as I didn’t follow it too well, but with Swinburne’s account, I was wondering what his basis was for assuming that intelligent life was so important for a deity to create. Surely if this is a traditional, omnibenevolent, theistic deity, then creating intelligent life capable of sinning would deplete the overall percentage of goodness in the universe meaning that the theist would have even more questions to answer by appealing to fine tuning
• Finally by looking through history, we see that God is often introduced as a God-of-the-gap, to fill in the spaces that science had not yet answered. Could this not just be the case for this example, and that we are introducing god just to satisfy our curiosity?

Inertial Effects

Inertial effects are felt when there is a change in constant straight motion- acceleration, rotation, changing direction etc.

This inertial effect that Newton showed was a direct attack on Descartes position in which he stated that objects are at true rest when they rest relative to their surroundings, but it also attacks the relationist, for the relationist claims that all motion is relational, so to explain the inertial effect, the relationist must hold that the bucket example is explicable by saying that the bucket is rotation relative to something. But what? Turning the Earth around the bucket may not cause this. There is no relation between the Earth and the water to make this happen, but this can be applied to the absolutist too. How can rotation in relation to absolute space cause inertial effects? How can immaterial space have a material effect? We cannot appeal to such things as the Sun and Earth to explain this effect for as a reference frame, they too are in rotation, so how can they explain the effects on other things. But if we were to turn the whole universe around the bucket, surely the inertial effect would happen? If it did, there would be no need for absolute space.

Then again, how can the universe have these immediate effects on the water?

Newton says the relationist cannot explain inertial effects as they are present independent of relational motion, but it seems to me they can be explained relationally.

Newton’s third laws, that actions and reactions are equal are problematic to the absolutist.

In the two globes example, we could say that, relationally, each globe is constantly moving away from the location it was previously at. This location is not in absolute space; it is just where the object is. There is somewhere 2cm away from where the globe is. Although nothing is there, as soon as we conceptualize the possibility of something being there, we can conceive of things moving in relation to this location, therefore, the globes will be moving in relation to this location. The globes can be moving truly, even though it cannot be observed. Just as if there are two cars in the universe. Relationally, they are both moving away from each other, but truly, the inertial effect felt in one of the cars shows it is truly at motion in relation to the other car, even though this cannot be observed. The inertial effect tells us which object is in true motion, but does in no way imply absolute space. So, the inertial effect on the globes shows us that the globes are moving, and as movement must be in relation to something, it is in relation to possible locations, or past locations, not real places in absolute space.

Similar position put forward in the book ‘A Box With No Sides’ (p49), but apparently this leads to problems with time and space, for if motion not relative to anything material were possible, how could we explain the succession of time? In defining position, we have presupposed time, and in defining time, we presuppose position, leading to a circular argument, so it is best to stick to understanding relative motion as motion relative to other objects (seems odd. How does this explain the 2 globes example? Mach would say there is another way to explain the apparent centrifugal force)

Inertial effects imply ‘true’ motion, not ‘absolute’ motion. If one object is in the universe, with no inertial effects, it could either be at true motion, or true rest. There is no way to tell, but this does not mean we have to introduce absolute space into the picture. There is no need to posit anything infinite here.

‘Berkeley suggested that, lacking any point of reference, a sphere in an otherwise empty Universe could not be conceived to rotate, and a pair of spheres could be conceived to rotate relative to one another, but not to rotate about their center of gravity’ – this seems wrong. If a single sphere had an inertial effect (i.e. being ‘squashed’) this implies true rotation, not absolute rotation. Completely misses the point of inertial effects.

Mach- ‘proposes that mechanics is entirely about relative motion of bodies and, in particular, mass is an expression of such relative motion. So, for example, a single particle in a Universe with no other bodies would have zero mass.’ So, for the rocket example, the passenger would have no gravitational nor inertial mass, so would feel no inertial effect. In the bucket example, we can apply the same line of thought. This example only really works if we imagine the bucket alone in the universe, for otherwise we could conceive of the universe being rotated around the bucket and the inertial effect being caused, thus reducing this to a relational explanation. If the bucket were on its own in the universe, there would be no inertial effect, because, as Mach points out, it would have zero mass, and without mass, there can be no inertial mass, thus no inertial effect. The absolutist could say that space gives mass, but this is counter to scientific observations such as when we go into space, and mass is depleted the further we recede from massive objects.

‘Absolutism is unnecessarily extravagant theory, introducing something that explains nothing’

Berkeley and Mach

Berkeley and Mach were relationists who attempted to take up and finish Leibniz’s arguments, especially when it came to inertial effects.

Both object to absolute space on the grounds put forward by Leibniz- namely PSR and PII. Absolutist talk is incomprehensible, just like ‘nelectricity’.

Berkeley says we cannot imagine a moving object without its moving relative to something else, so a purely absolute motion is inconceivable. He says that in the two globes example, without a material reference body, no motion in the globes can be conceived, so some other explanation must be used for the tension in the chord, or he notion of the tension is nonsense.

Mach takes a realist position. Nobody possesses the skills needed to make use of any speculative absolutist view. There is no need for it, this it is meaningless. We cannot properly conceive of motion in a world of only one object, and so we do not know how that object would behave. ‘We cannot know how K would act in the absence of A, B, C’. Newton is on no position to claim what would happen in such a situation.

Both say that the idea of positions in an absolute space are also nonsense for they are unobservable and unknowable, but, as has been said before, Absolute space does seem to have observable, inertial consequences- can we not say that inertial effects provide a realist, empirical proof of absolute space?. In response, the relationist must be able to explain these inertial effects in a relational way. Such a theory, it is said, would be stronger than Newton’s as it would be simpler, and much more meaningful as it would avoid untestable predictions.

Can Berkeley and Mach give us a strong relationist theory of Inertia?

What is absolute motion? Newton says it’s rotation in the reference frame of absolute space, but what could a relationist say?

Both Berkeley and Mach said that absolute motion was motion relative to the ‘fixed stars’. Instead of bringing in absolute space here, we just consider space to be confined to the heavens and fixed stars, which are considered, as far as we can observe, to be at rest.

Mach’s realist position led him to say talk of absolute space is meaningless, and even inertial effects can be explained in relational terms, for all that is observed is the bucket’s rotation relative to the Earth and other celestial bodies. Mach says the stars are not the reference frame (as Leibniz may have held), but the center of mass of the entire universe, so when we accelerate in a car, we will be pushed back in out seat relative to the universe as a whole; relative to the centre of mass (worked out be averaging masses and their location).

So, for Mach, if the universe was spun around the bucked, the inertial effect would be the same. According to PII, the universe would be the same, for no observable difference would be possible.

Mach disliked Newton’s liking for the absolute, but his ideas are much similar. He has a belief in the absolute importance of empiricism. He does not give a theory of how these inertial effects work, as Newton seems to, but believes that these effects will be caused by some gravitational-like force that acts only on accelerating bodies (relative to the centre mass of the universe). Viz. Matter takes the role of Newtonian absolute space.

Newton does ask how the heavens could curve the water, as Mach’s theory demands.

Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

‘To suppose two things indiscernible is to suppose the same thing under two names’. If the two universes cannot be told apart, according to PII, they are one and the same. Introducing Absolute space makes them different, this violating the principle.

Clarke says that the PII does not hold, for his ship example shows that there can be motion that is unobserved, just as absolute motion could be. Just because it is not observed, it does not mean it is not happening.

Leibniz clarifies his point here. He says that for objects to be different, it is not necessary for a difference to be observed, but only that it must be possible for the difference to be observed, which, in the ship case, is possible.

In kinematic shift (changing from one direction to another) however, there is no reference frame from which a difference could be seen. Leibniz holds that in such cases, PII does apply, and thus there is no difference, for we would never know of such a change, so why posit it? It is just empty talk and imaginative conceptions.

Leibniz’s arguments only have force if we accept PII. But we do seem to have reason to accept PII. Example in book goes along the lines of someone positing ‘nelectricity’, a charge of which everything carries, but this has no effect on anything. It is unobservable. We would probably say there is no nelectricity at all. Different nelectric charges are indiscernible so are nothing at all. The difference between the world as it was and the world with the new discovery is undetectable, hence does not exist.

Such is the case of absolute space, which has no effect on the world. It is unobservable, just like nelectricity. PII entails that we say AS is not real, for it is unobservable thus Newton has failed to tell us what absolute space and velocity is, seems he has not told us how to distinguish between them. This is a very Machian, realist position.

This empiricist interpretation if the PII suggests that it is meaningless and useless to posit absolute space seems there is no way we could observe any difference from one absolute space than another, thus this seems like a strong objection to Newton and Clarke.

A problem here arises; inertial effects. In Newton’s bucket and globes example, Clarke suggests that though, strictly speaking, absolute space is unobservable, we can get around PII by saying that the effects of absolute space or absolute motion are observable. We need absolute space to explain these inertial effects. Leibniz says very little on this point unfortunately. He says there is a difference between ‘true’ and relative motions. He talks about the ‘cause f the change being within the body itself’, but this tells us little, if anything about absolute acceleration in relational terms Leibniz dies before he could provide a further reply, but it is interesting to consider what this reply might have been like.

In static shifts, PII does seem to hold, but in dynamic shifts, the presence of inertial effects seems to posit absolute space, even though no motion can be seen from any reference frame.

In conclusion, PII seems very damaging to absolute space, but only in consideration of static shifts. In considering dynamic shifts, we PII does not hold, but that is not to say there are other relationist ways around the problem of inertial effects.

Principle of Sufficient Reason and Absolute Space

Newton’s claim of the existence of Absolute space was attacked by the relationist Leibniz in a correspondence with the absolutist Clarke. Leibniz appealed to the maxim that nothing happens to be one way without a reason for it being such, and said that through looking at absolute space from this angle, it would be shown to be untrue.

Here, Leibniz’s choice of the word ‘reason’ might be somewhat misleading, so it is best to understand this as the principle of sufficient ‘cause’, in that everything must have a sufficient cause.

Here, Leibniz says that if there were this absolute, homogenous space, there would be no reason, or no cause, for God to have created the world where it is in relation to absolute space as opposed to somewhere else (ironically, it is Clarke who first mentioned the different universes, which were then turned against him). There could be no rational explanation for the universe to be where it was, thus implying that God had acted irrationally.

Clarke then counters this point by pointing out that the cause for the universe being where it is can be explained by Gods will. All that was requisite for the universe to be where it is is that God willed it to be in such a place. To say God could not make such a decision is derogatory to his free will. This is similar to the story in Godwin’s book ‘Free Fall’ in which the main character feels truly alive when he is confronted with three different paths to take to a field, as there is no reason for why he would choose one path over another; thus he is totally free to do as he pleases without any external influences.

Leibniz counters this by pointing out a more psychological point, asking what would make God pick one location rather than another. There must be some cause behind God’s choice. This point is a pre-emption of behavioural psychology, where one can look for cognitive, sub-conscious reasons for ones acting in one way rather than another. Clarke says that no further reason other than God’s will is needed, but this reply seems inadequate. Clarke has already agreed with Leibniz that PSR does hold, but then seems to rule this out when it comes to God’s willing. By saying that God acts without some reason implies that his action was random, but developments in psychology don’t seem to align with this way of thinking. If I were given a piece of paper, and asked to draw a circle anywhere on it, and decided, for no reason known to myself, to draw one in the top left corner, the psychologist claims, based on scientific methodology, that there are reasons for why I chose this part of the paper, even though I am unaware of these reasons.

Leibniz’s alternative to absolute space- Relationism- does no seem to fall victim to this problem. Without absolute space, the ‘placing’ of the universe is nonsensical, because there is nothing to place the universe in. The universe just is the interrelation, and relations between the material objects present. One could ask, why did God place these objects in such relations as they are, but this can be overcome by pointing out that even if God had just thrown these objects, so to speak, then they could have come to the relations they have now merely by physical forces acting upon the different masses, causing the repelling and attraction of some to others.

Then again, we could take another step back and ask, what is the sufficient reason for these physical forces? But this question can be asked to both the relationist and absolutist for these laws hold true in both cases and so answering this question does not seem to have any bearing on the existence of non-existence of absolute space. These questions seem more suited to the physicist.

These arguments seem to rest heavily on different conceptions of God, which neither Leibniz nor Clarke properly argue for. Leibniz assumes God’s willing has the same basis as our willing, Clarke assumes that God’s willing is not subject to PSR. Besides this important point, it does seem that Leibniz’s view is more compelling as it relies less on abstract conceptions of the imagination. His Descartian rationalist approach seems to demand less of the world than the alternative absolutist view.

What can be said from this argument however is that thus far, the world can be explained without reference to absolute space. As soon as Newtonian Absolute space is posited, we are left with more questions than we started with. What is this space? Is it a substance or property? Where did it come from? How can it have an effect on material things?

The idea that the universe exists in absolute space alone shines no light whatsoever on our understanding of the world. There seems to be no basis for positing such a thing other than attempting to explain the common preconception of an infinite amount of empty pace in the universe, which, when thought about in more detail, as Leibniz, and Mach did, really clears up nothing. Even the difficult problem of inertial effects can be explained in relational terms, so there seems to be no reason to conjure up this absolute space. That is not to say it does not exist, just that with appeal to Ockham’s Razor, it seems nonsensical to hold absolutism over Relationism due to its much higher demand for explanation, and the multiple questions it raises of itself, so in this light, Relationism does seem to come out on top.

(Note, PSR doesn’t seem to pre-suppose any intelligent creator, another positive for Leibniz: ch8, Space and time)

Divine Omnipotence

THOMAS MORRIS; A MODERN DISCUSSION OF DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE

In Christianity, it is said that ‘with God all things are possible’, but what does this mean?

What is the magnitude of God’s power?

1. God can do everything-Entails god can create spherical cubes. When you have the expression of a logical impossibility, you end up with nothing that can even be a candidate for power ascriptions. The net result being nothing at all, no task specified.

2.  God can do everything logically possible- But there’s a massive gap between what is logically possible and what we can do. It doesn’t seem cautious enough. If each of us has free will, then it is possible for us to do something not done by God. But we do not want to say that God can do something not done by God

3. Anything which it is logically possible for God to do, he can do- Just because it is logically possible for me to do something, it does not mean I can do it. Also, this leaves open the possibility that God can be weak in numerous ways i.e. it may not be logically possible for God to do something we would usually see as a simple task. Do we want to allow this?

4. Anything that it is logically possible for a perfect being to do, God can do- Better than 3, because any weakness is surely an imperfection, but the usefulness of this definition depends on our having some prior sense of what is logically possible for a perfect being to do. If part of perfection is omnipotence, we have reached a sort of circularity.

GEACH believed it was hopeless to try and understand God’s power in terms of things God can do, so he put forward ‘almightiness’ . Instead of looking at that God can do, we could look at the powers God possesses.

The power to create ex nihilo (from nothing), is the most fundamental sort of power and is relevant to our understanding of the power of God.

Note, that when I say ‘Jones cannot do x’, I may mean that Jones lacks the power necessary for doing x. Or, again, I may grant him the power and the skill, but believe he lacks the opportunity for drawing on that power. He may lack the practical knowledge of his situation to realise x.

Alternatively, we could say that doing x would be contrary to Jones’ firmly entrenched character and personality, thus he cannot do it. This is very different from talking about power, skill, opportunity or practical knowledge’. This is ‘moral capability’ or ‘capability’.

There is one final factor potentially involved in action; will power. The element of determination in pursuing a line of action.

So, one must be ‘able’ to do x (via power, skill opportunity and practical knowledge), have the determination to do x, and have the moral capability to do x. When all these are present,  one ‘can do x’. In other words, we’re not always talking about ‘power’ here.

This is why any explination of what God can do, his omnipotence, is so difficult. Keeping these things in mind will help us understand the simpler notion of omnipotence in terms of power possessed.

So, what is the magnitude of divine power?

It can be said that when we describe God as omnipotent, we commit ourselves to his having every power which it is logically possible to possess. It is impossible to imagine coherently and greater account of perfect power.

PROBLEMS FOR DIVINE POWER

The Ctitic’s argument is ‘the paradox of the stone’. If god were omnipotent, could he create a stone which he could not lift?

• If no, then he is not omnipotent, for he cannot create the object
• If yes, then he is not omnipotent, for he does not have the power to lift it

Thus, God is not omnipotent. There cannot be such a being. This is the critic’s argument.

paradox

This critique assumes that if there is something specifiable that God cannot do, he is not omnipotent, but this is too quick,if we understand omnipotence to be ‘perfect power’ as Kenny suggests.

It seems here that God only lacks the power, skill, opportunity, determination or moral capability to perform the act. It does not directly follow that there is some power God lacks. Actions such as creating a married batchelor do not even present a possible candidate for action, so no power here is missing.

Some philosophers hold that the act needed to create the unliftable stone is an incoherent act description. It does not designate a logically possible power, thus it does not show that God lacks any power.

Other philosophers do not think that this is an incoherent act description. They hold that there still might be a possible form or source of immobility that can’t be overcome even by God. If God cannot ascribe this property to the stone, then he lacks a possible power.

Ho would such a property work?

An alternative is that God could create a stone, and promose never to lift it, therefore creating a stone that he cannot move. God cannot do x, because he does not have the moral capability to do x. Here, yes, God can create a stone he cannot lift. Here, God does not have a lack of power.

In sum, whether God can or cannot create the immovable stone does not show him to lack omnipotence. In both instances, he can be shown to retain omnipotence.

Some philosophers have argued that necessary goodness is incompatible with omnipotence. Surely it is logically possible to possess the power of sin, yet on so many accounts God is perfectly good, thus cannot possess the ower of sin.

There are two responses to this

1. We could acknowledge that there is this power that God lacks, but then we would have to revise our conception of the magnitude of divine power. But if morality were part of God, and we said that none of God’s capacities could have a negative impact on his perfection, so that his perfection is not self-destructing
2. (Best response) Deny that there is a causal-power to sin. If God is necessarily good, then it is impossible for him to Sin, or ‘God cannot sin’.  This does not mean God lacks any power, ‘the power to sin’, as has been explained before.

To say that God cannot sin indicated a necessarily firm directedness in the way in which God will use his unlimited power.

There are many powers necessary for sinning in various ways, but there is no single, distinct power to sin. The difference is not in the powers possessed, but in the moral capacity for employing these powers, thus God can still be considered omnipotent.

A remaining problem? How can the positive ascription of omnipotence ever be justified? Is the provision of a positive ground impossible? We ascribe powers through observing what people do, but we can never whitness so much of God’s action to ascribe omnipotence to him.

Not only would we never be able to see this omnipotence, God too would not be able to justifiably believe it, or know it.

There is a simple answer. God does not come to know himself inferrentially. Thomas Aquinas taught us that God knows himself directly. Secondly, we do not have to rely on observations for our ascriptions to God. We hold he is omnipotent because of the requirements of a perfect being. We dedude this from conceptual and intuitive resources. So until there is an observation to believe the contrary, we are justified in holding God’s omnipotence.

Space, Time & Causality, S1

Absolutist- Space is euclidian everywhere (everywhere the same), so nothing will act any differently, no matter where you put it.

Positivist (logical positivism)- without observable evidence, what we talk about, i.e. bsolute space, is meaningless. (If we can’t verify terminology, it is meaningless, so the rationalist says that the absolutist is not positivist as they are appealing to non-observable entities, making them meaningless.

However, positivism is often rejected, because the actual positivist principle itself cannot be verified! And we should hope that we CAN use merely theoretical ideas, especially in subjects such as metaphysics and theoretical physics, without which, the subjects, however useful they are, would collapse.

Modal Relationism- based on mere possibilities. Non-committing. Space possibly exists even though no material object is present, because this is what is in accordance with nature.

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Principle of sufficient reason (PSR)- nothing should happen without sufficient reason why it should not be otherwise. But is there a sufficient reason for this proposition to be true? (parallell attack to the positivism attack).

If we do accept this principle, we have to acknowledge that the universe is where it is for no reason. This is a contradiction, and Leibniz thinks it better to drop absolute space in favour for this ‘intuitive’ principle of PSR.

In response to this, we could either deny PSR, or we could redefine absolute space, so that it fits in with PSR. i.e. instead of saying that space has the same properties everywhere, we could say that it does not, thereby giving reason for the universe to be where it is.

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Clarke says that anything finite is movable. If this is not true, thenthis logically implies that all of space is occupied by material objects, as this would be the only way for a finite object to be prevented from being moved.

Leibniz says that the objects are not moving THROUGH space, simply the relation between objects is changing, so there is no need for Clarke’s argumet here. If absolutism were true, Clarke’s argument would be so, but as it is not, Clarke’s argument is null and void and we can explain everything in terms of relations between objects (so Leibniz thinks).

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Against PSR

PSR seems to lead to an infinite regress. (What’s the problem with this?). We could say that every effect has a causal event apart from one thing that is not an ‘event’, that is to say ‘God’ (Cite, Lock).

The Absolutist has to say why we would be in P1 rather than P2. Reason? Because Yesterday we were in P1, and there has been no reason for us to have moved.

In other words, if the relationist doesn’t defeat the problem of an infinite regress, then the absolutist doesn’t either.

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Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

If things are the same in every way, they are the same things but with different names.

An Absolutist would say that PII may be true, but in the examples given, what differes is the PLACES, so the two universes are actually discernible.

Or we could attack PII using the sphere example. If we split a sphere in half, then both halves are the same, thereby making them the same thing. If we keep doing this, eventually the sphere will be reduced to a dot, making the theory of PII have absurd consequences.

Maybe PII is of no real use. It is not positivist, and cannot be realised in a material world as 2 exactly similar objects cannot occupy the same space. Can we even conceive of this?